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6 School-Sector Effects on Student Achievement in
India
Geeta G. Kingdon
Analysis of education in India in general and of private and public
schools in particular is hampered by the lack of available data. Despite
recent improvements, there is a serious dearth of reliable educational
data in India. First, the ofﬁcial data collection exercise on schools (both
annually and in the periodic All India Education Survey) collects infor-
mation only on the so-called ‘‘recognized’’ schools. Thus, large num-
bers of private schools are not included in the ofﬁcial data since they
are ‘‘unrecognized’’ (Kingdon 1996a). Second, coverage of even the rec-
ognized schools is incomplete. For instance, coverage of various types
of special schools is patchy across different states, such as central
schools, army schools, education guarantee schools, schools registered
with national examination boards, and so on (Mehta 2005). Third, en-
rollment ﬁgures in school-returns data are unreliable because failing
publicly funded schools exaggerate their student numbers to justify
their existence (Dre`ze and Kingdon 1998). Fourth, no national-, state-,
or district-level data are collected on student learning achievement in
primary and junior education in private and public schools; while
exam boards do have achievement data for the secondary school level,
these are not publicly available to researchers and, in any case, they
are not linked to student, teacher, and school characteristics. The
Annual Status of Education Report (Pratham 2007) collects national
household data on over 300,000 primary-age children’s learning
achievements but does not collect much information on home back-
ground or on schools and teachers.
Partly reﬂecting this lack of data, there is a paucity of good research
on educational issues in India. Most of the existing research based on
small surveys and using achievement production functions merely
establishes correlations rather than causation between student achieve-
ment and particular school inputs. The inability to deal convincingly
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with issues of the potential endogeneity of school inputs has been due
to the ubiquitous problems of lack of credible instruments and lack
of panel or experimental data, though some recent studies have used
randomized experiments to study the impact of particular educational
interventions (Banerjee et al. 2005; Duﬂo and Hanna 2005; Muralid-
haran and Sundararaman 2006; Pandey, Goyal, and Levine 2006) and
others have used statistical techniques such as propensity-score match-
ing methods ( Jalan and Glinskaya 2002), instrumental variable meth-
ods (Kingdon and Teal 2007), pupil ﬁxed-effects approaches (Kingdon
2006), and treatment effect models (Schmid 2006).
The ﬁrst section of this chapter presents evidence on the relative
sizes of private, aided, and government schooling sectors in India. The
second section examines the relative effectiveness and per pupil costs
of private and public schools in India and the ﬁnal section discusses
India’s experience with public-private partnerships in education.
6.1 The Relative Sizes of the Private and Public Schooling Sectors
The very ﬁrst fact about the private and public schools in India is that
even their relative enrollment shares are not known with a degree of
accuracy. This is mainly due to a failure to include all types of schools
in ofﬁcial data collections but also partly due to exaggeration of enroll-
ments in publicly funded schools in these data (Kingdon 1996a; Dre`ze
and Kingdon 1998).
6.1.1 Typology of School Types in India
There are three main school types in India: government, aided, and pri-
vate. Schools run by the central, state, or local governments are re-
ferred to as government schools. Schools run by private managements
but funded largely by government grant-in-aid are known as private
aided or just aided schools. They charge the same fee levels as govern-
ment schools (which is now mandated to be nil) and pay the same sal-
ary rates to teachers as in government schools. From the early 1970s
onward, their teachers have been paid directly from the state govern-
ment treasury and are recruited by a government-appointed Education
Service Commission rather than by the school. Thus, government and
aided schools are now quite similar in their mode of operation. Schools
run by private managements without state aid are known as ‘‘private
unaided’’ schools. These run entirely on fee revenues and have virtu-
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ally no government involvement in matters such as teacher recruit-
ment. These are thus the genuinely private schools and we refer to
these simply as ‘‘private’’ schools rather than using their full name ‘‘pri-
vate unaided.’’
Private schools in turn divide into two types: recognized schools and
unrecognized schools. Government recognition is an ofﬁcial stamp of
approval. To be eligible for government recognition, a private school is
by law required to fulﬁll a number of conditions.1 However, hardly
any private schools that get recognition actually fulﬁll all the condi-
tions. For instance, many recognized private schools in Uttar Pradesh
run in rented buildings when having an owned building is a mandated
condition of recognition (Kingdon 1994). Indeed, some of the condi-
tions are or have over time become mutually inconsistent.2 The main
beneﬁt of recognition used to be that with recognition a school became
entitled to issue valid transfer certiﬁcates (TCs), which are a mandated
requirement for admission into upper primary and secondary schools.
However, the emergence of large numbers of unrecognized primary
schools (as shown later) suggests this requirement is no longer strictly
applied and that, de facto, recognized and unrecognized schools may
not be too different in terms of their physical facilities and modus
operandi.
6.1.2 Private Schooling Share According to Ofﬁcial and Household
Data
Despite the data deﬁciencies listed above, it is clear that the fee-
charging private schooling sector in India is much larger than thought
in the past. Kingdon (1996a) challenged the prevailing notion in Indian
writings, based on ofﬁcial published data, that the size of the private
sector in primary education was ‘‘inﬁnitesimally small’’ or ‘‘negligibly
small.’’
Table 6.1 shows the enrollment share of private schools in rural and
urban India, according to both ofﬁcial school returns data in 1993 and
2002 and household survey data from 1993 and 2006. The bottom half
of the table shows corresponding ﬁgures for Uttar Pradesh, a state
with high levels of private school participation. The latest ﬁgures for
the year 2005–06 from the District Information System for Education
(DISE) are not shown because of its incomplete coverage.
Table 6.1 shows that according to ofﬁcial statistics, in 1993, only 2.8%
of all rural primary school students in India were studying in private
School-Sector Effects on Student Achievement in India 113
(AutoPDF V7 20/8/08 16:04) MIT (Econ 69") Pal_L J-1959 Chakrabarti AC2: WSL 20/08/2008 pp. 111–140 1959_06_Ch06 (p. 113)
schools but that, according to household survey data for the same year,
10.1% of all rural Indian 6–10-year-old school attendees went to a pri-
vate school, a ﬁgure more than three times as high as the ofﬁcial esti-
mate.3 In rural Uttar Pradesh, ofﬁcial estimates for primary education
put the 1993 enrollment share of private schools at 8.8% but according
to the 1993–94 National Council of Applied Economic Research
(NCAER) household survey, the actual share was 30.7%, again more
than three times as high as the ofﬁcial estimate. By the time of the Pub-
lic Report on Education (PROBE) survey in 1996, 36% of all primary-
age students (6–11-year-olds) in rural Uttar Pradesh attended private
Table 6.1
Enrollment Share of Private Schools, 1993–2006
Area School level
Ofﬁcial
published
data
1993
Household
survey
data
1993
Ofﬁcial
published
data
2002
Household
survey
data
2006
All India
Rural Primary 2.8 10.1 5.8 19.5
Junior/middle 6.5 7.9 11.1 20.4
Secondary 6.8 10.1 14.3 22.8
Urban Primary 25.7 26.2* 28.9 NA
Junior/middle 18.8 15.4* 39.1 NA
Secondary 11.5 11.2* 32.4 NA
Uttar Pradesh
Rural Primary 8.8 30.7 15.6 30.5
Junior/middle 28.3 23.3 31.0 35.0
Secondary 10.9 14.4 41.0 37.8
Urban Primary 53.3 49.7* 64.1 NA
Junior/middle 29.6 25.1* 48.2 NA
Secondary 5.3 11.3* 29.7 NA
Source: 1993 ofﬁcial data computed from Sixth All India Education Survey (NCERT 1998).
2002 ofﬁcial data computed from Seventh All India Education Survey, available at hhttp://
gov.ua.nic.in/NScheduleData/main3.aspxi. Rural household survey ﬁgures for 1993 are
based on the author’s calculations from 1993–94 NCAER survey. The urban household
survey ﬁgures marked * are taken from 1995–96 National Sample Survey published in
NSSO (1998, A69–82). Household survey ﬁgures for 2006 for rural India taken from
ASER2006 (Pratham 2007).
Note: In ofﬁcial data I have taken grades 9–12 as secondary school, i.e., corresponding to
students aged about 15–18 years old. ASER household survey collected data only on chil-
dren up to age 16, so children aged 7–10, 11–14, and 15–16 are assumed to be in primary,
middle, and secondary school respectively. In ASER, 18.6% of all children aged 7–10
were in private school and 4.6% were not in school, thus the private school share
of total school enrollment is taken to be ð18:6=ð100 4:6Þ  100 ¼ 19:5%Þ and similar cal-
culations were performed for middle and secondary school ages.
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schools (PROBE Team 1999). Table 6.1 also shows that the enrollment
share of private schools at the primary level rose from 2.8% in 1993 to
5.8% in 2002. If the extent of underestimation of private enrollment in
2002 is the same as in 1993, then the true private school share of total
primary enrollments in rural India is three times as high as 5.8%, that
is, about 17%. This is close to the only recent national estimate avail-
able: the ASER-2006 national sample survey of over 330,000 house-
holds across 15,800 villages ﬁnds that 19.5% of school-going rural 7–
10-year-olds attended private schools in 2006.4 Table 6.1 shows that in
urban India, private schools’ share of total enrolment in 2002 was be-
tween about 30 and 40% at different levels of education, though being
an ofﬁcial ﬁgure, this ignores the numerous enrollments in private
unrecognized schools.
Some reasons for the large discrepancy between household survey
estimates and ofﬁcial estimates of the size of the private schooling sec-
tor in India are discussed in Kingdon (1996a) and Dre`ze and Kingdon
(1998): First, government and aided school teachers have an incentive
to over-report their enrollments when there is low demand for such
schools (since a school with falling rolls would lose teachers), and this
reduces the apparent enrollment share of private schools; second, as
previously stated, all ofﬁcial school ‘‘censuses’’ are carried out only in
the government-recognized schools, and in most Indian states there is
no requirement on private primary schools to be registered, let alone
government-recognized. It seems that rural private schools in particu-
lar do not easily get government recognition, for which many condi-
tions need to be satisﬁed. As Kingdon (1996a) says, given the exacting
conditions for and scant rewards of recognition, it is not surprising that
private primary schools remain unrecognized.
The true size of the private schooling sector is greatly underesti-
mated in ofﬁcial data due to enumerating only the recognized schools.
Household survey data give a much more accurate picture since
parents have no incentives to over-report enrollment in publicly
funded schools or to report enrollment in recognized schools only.
Household survey data in table 6.1 suggest the extent to which the
enrollment share of private schools in primary education is underesti-
mated in ofﬁcial data—namely by about 67% in rural areas. Muralid-
haran and Kremer (2006) ﬁnd that in their national survey of 20 states,
51% of all private primary schools were unrecognized. This accords
with evidence from individual states in other studies.5
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Private schooling is utilized even among the poor in India. Findings
from the Micro Impacts at Macroeconomic Policies (MIMAP) survey
show that, of all enrolled children aged 5–10-years-old living below
the poverty line, 14.8% attended private schools (8% in rural and 36%
in urban India). The corresponding ﬁgures for ages 11–14 ( junior
school age) and 15–17 (secondary school age) were 13.8% and 7.0% re-
spectively (Pradhan and Subramaniam 2000). That private schools are
used by poor families is also found in ﬁve north Indian states (PROBE
Team 1999) and by Tooley and Dixon (2003) in Andhra Pradesh.
6.1.3 Growth in Private Schooling
The most telling statistic, however, is not the share of private schooling
in the stock of total school enrollment, but rather the share of private
schooling in the total recent increase in school enrollment at differ-
ent levels. This shows the relative growth of private schooling in
India (i.e., relative to the growth of government and aided schooling).
Table 6.2 presents the proportion of the total enrollment increase (over
time) that is absorbed by private schools. It is constructed from under-
lying numbers as shown in table 6.A.1 for urban India.6 Although
information in these ofﬁcial statistics excludes the numerous unrecog-
Table 6.2
Share of Recognized Private Schools in Total Enrollment Increase, by Region, Level of
Education, and Time Period
1978–86 1986–93 1993–2002
Rural
Primary 2.8 18.5 24.4
Middle 7.2 12.8 23.2
Secondary 5.8 15.8 30.9
Urban
Primary 56.8 60.5 95.7
Middle 35.7 31.8 71.7
Secondary 17.7 17.7 46.7
Rural & Urban
Primary 13.5 35.3 38.9
Middle 15.0 21.4 37.8
Secondary 10.7 16.8 38.4
Source: Author’s own calculations based on enrollment by school management type in
the All India Education Surveys for various years (NCERT 1982, 1992, 1998, 2006). See
table 6.A.1 for the underlying urban data.
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nized schools, even recognized private school growth numbers are
telling.
We learn two things from table 6.2: ﬁrst, that growth of private
schooling has accelerated over time; second, that in urban areas the
growth of private schooling has consistently been the greatest at the
primary level and progressively smaller at the middle and secondary
school levels, which is perverse from the equity point of view since
children of the poor are most well-represented at the primary school-
ing level.
Table 6.2 shows that in urban India, 56.8% of all the increase in total
primary school enrollment in the period 1978–86 was absorbed by pri-
vate schools; the corresponding ﬁgure for 1986–93 was 60.5% and for
the period 1993–2002 was 95.7%. Clearly, the pace of ‘‘privatization’’
increased greatly in the 1993–2002 period. In this nine-year period,
government and aided primary schools together absorbed only 4.3%
of the total net increase in primary school enrollments, that is, their
numbers or enrollments grew very slowly. Nearly 96% of the total in-
crease in urban primary enrollment was due to the growth of private
schooling! It bears emphasizing that even this dramatic statistic is an
underestimate since it takes no account of enrollment growth in the
numerous unrecognized private schools that are excluded from the of-
ﬁcial statistics. The recent growth of private primary schooling in
urban India has been nothing short of massive. In rural India the rate
of expansion of private primary schooling has been much slower but
even here the pace of privatization picked up over time: only 2.8% of
total rural growth in primary enrollment in the 1978–86 period was
absorbed by private schools, but the corresponding ﬁgure for the
1986–93 period was 18.5% and for 1993–2002, 24.4%. Again, these
ﬁgures are all underestimates since they do not include growth in
enrollments in the unrecognized private primary schools. It is also
worth stating that any increase in aided school enrollments—shown in
table 6.A.1—(if it comes from the establishment of new aided schools
rather than merely from expansion in enrollment size in existing aided
schools) represents in fact an increase in private schools since
aided schools are private schools that start receiving government
grant-in-aid.
In some states, acceleration in the growth of private schooling
was spectacular even in the 1986–93 period. For instance, in urban
Uttar Pradesh (not shown in table 6.2), 94% of all new primary school
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enrollment over the period 1986–93 occurred in private schools. The
growth of private schooling, particularly at primary and middle levels
of education, signals growing inequality of educational opportunity.
The growth of private schooling offers a possible explanation for the
fact that despite falling or virtually static per-capita public education
expenditure in several Indian states and falling share of elementary
education expenditure in state domestic product (Dre`ze and Sen 2002),
these states have improved their educational outcome indicators in the
1990s (Kingdon et al. 2004).
In the next section I examine evidence on the relative effectiveness
of private, aided, and government schools in India. This may help to
explain—at least in part—the relative popularity and growth of differ-
ent school types.
6.2 Internal Efﬁciency of Private and Public Schools
6.2.1 Relative Effectiveness of Private and Public Schools
Until recently, due to the lack of achievement data linked to school and
teacher characteristics, studies of the relative effectiveness of public
and private schools in India have had to rely on achievement tests car-
ried out by the researchers themselves in small samples of schools
(Bashir 1994, 1997; Govinda and Varghese 1993; Kingdon 1994, 1996b;
Tooley and Dixon 2003). These studies have been carried out in differ-
ent parts of India (Tamil Nadu, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, and
Andhra Pradesh respectively) and differ in several respects7 but they
share the common conclusion that private school students generally
outperform their public school counterparts in learning achievement
even after controlling for schools’ student intakes. Recently, Muralid-
haran and Kremer (2006) corroborate the ﬁndings in earlier studies
with nationally representative data on rural primary schools.
Bashir (1994, 1997) found that in the southern Indian state of Tamil
Nadu, private primary school students performed signiﬁcantly better
in mathematics than government school students, though this was not
true in Tamil language achievement (although many of the private
schools were English-medium schools, unlike government schools,
which were Tamil-medium). She also found aided schools to be
more effective than government schools. Govinda and Varghese (1993)
found that in the central Indian state of Madhya Pradesh, achievement
levels of primary school students in private unaided schools were con-
siderably higher—in both mathematics and language—than those of
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pupils in either aided or government schools. A private school effect
remained even after controlling for differences in home background
and school inputs. Kingdon (1994) found that in the northern Indian
state of Uttar Pradesh, private school students outperformed their
aided and government school counterparts and that aided and govern-
ment schools were similar in terms of their effectiveness in imparting
learning. Muralidharan and Kremer (2006) bring national data to bear
on this issue. They ﬁnd that in rural India, private school students out-
perform public school students.
As is well known, even in studies that have information on measur-
able student characteristics, a major problem in studying the impact of
school type on student achievement is that students may choose school
type on the basis of unobserved traits such as ability and motivation.
If so, then any private school achievement advantage over public
schools—after controlling for observed student characteristics—cannot
simply be attributed to school type. To have a clean impact evaluation,
one needs either an experiment with students randomly assigned to
private and public schools, or a convincing way of dealing with endog-
enous sample selection into private and public schools. There are no
randomized experiments available in India to study the relative effec-
tiveness of private and public schools. Kingdon 1996 is the only peer-
reviewed journal study for India that attempts to control for potential
endogenous selection into different school types on the basis of un-
observed characteristics using the Heckman procedure.
As an illustration, table 6.3 summarizes this study’s ﬁndings from
Uttar Pradesh. The method of comparing the relative effectiveness of
the different school types is as follows: Choose a pupil at random from
the entire student population in the district and give her the average
characteristics of the full sample of pupils, say X. Then, using the ﬁtted
selectivity-corrected achievement (ACH) equations for government (G),
private aided (PA) and private unaided (PUA) schools, predict a score
for this representative student if she were to attend a G school, another
score if it were a PA school, and a third score if it were a PUA school.
That is, predict an achievement score in each school type as:
ACHG ¼ b^GX ð6:1Þ
ACHPA ¼ b^PAX ð6:2Þ
ACHPUA ¼ b^PUAX ð6:3Þ
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where the b^s are the estimated coefﬁcient vectors in the three different
sectors and X is a vector of mean values of the explanatory variables,
averaged over the entire sample. Now PUA schools’ achievement
advantage over G schools, for example, can be calculated as (6.3) 
(6.1), PA schools’ relative advantage over G schools as (6.2) (6.1),
and so on. The achievement scores thus calculated and the relative
achievement advantages of different school types are presented in
table 6.3.
Table 6.3, column B, shows that the unadjusted (raw) mean achieve-
ment advantage of private unaided schools over government and
aided schools in all subjects falls greatly when personal endowments
and sample selectivity of pupils are controlled for. For example, PUA
schools’ raw mathematics-score premium over G schools of 8.12 points
falls to just 1.42 points. This implies that, of the PUA schools’ mathe-
matics advantage of 8.12 points vis a` vis G schools, 82% is explained by
Table 6.3
Raw and Standardized Achievement Scores and Relative Advantage Points by Sector
and Subject: G, PA, and PUA Schools
(A)
Achievement points
(B)
Achievement advantage points
G
(a)
PA
(b)
PUA
(c)
PUA-G
(c a)
PUA-PA
(c b)
PA-G
(b a)
Mathematics
Raw 8.97 8.36 17.09 8.12 8.73 0.61
Standardized (d) 11.38 10.09 12.80 1.42
[18]
2.71
[31]
1.29
[211]
Reading
Raw 9.77 10.86 16.85 7.08 5.99 1.09
Standardized (e) 13.78 13.73 13.82 0.04
[1]
0.09
[2]
0.05
[5]
Achievement
Raw 18.74 19.22 33.94 15.20 14.72 0.48
Standardized (dþ e) 25.16 23.82 26.62 1.46
[10]
2.80
[19]
1.34
[279]
OLS standardized
achievement points
20.57 22.60 27.56 6.99 4.96 2.03
Note: The maximum marks possible in the math and reading tests were 36 and 29 respec-
tively. Thus, the maximum achievement mark was the total of the two, i.e., 65. The ﬁg-
ures in brackets are the standardized achievement advantages as a percentage of the raw
achievement advantages. The negative signs imply achievement disadvantages.
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student intake and only 18% can be attributed to school inﬂuences. The
PUA schools’ raw mathematics advantage over PA schools falls from
8.73 points to 2.71 points, so that 31% of the observed PUA math ad-
vantage is due to school-related factors and 69% due to student intake.
The predicted mathematics score of a child in a PUA school (12.80
points) is 27% higher than her predicted math score in a PA school,
where it would be 10.09 points. In other words, PUA schools are 27%
more effective than PA schools in their math teaching.8
G schools’ tiny mathematics advantage over PA schools increases
after controls, suggesting that G schools are more effective in impart-
ing numeracy skills than PA schools. It is notable that all three school
types are roughly equally effective in imparting reading skills. The raw
reading-score premiums virtually disappear when student background
and selectivity are controlled.
The ﬁnding in econometric studies—that private schools are gener-
ally more effective than public schools in India—is broadly corrobo-
rated by the qualitative ﬁndings of the PROBE report, based on a
survey of 242 villages in 5 north Indian states (PROBE Team 1999).
The authors emphasize low teaching activity in public schools. The re-
port states that the extreme cases of teacher negligence were ‘‘less dev-
astating than the quiet inertia of the majority of teachers. . . . In half of
the sample schools, there was no teaching activity at the time of the
investigators’ visit. . . . Inactive teachers were found engaged in a vari-
ety of pastimes such as sipping tea, reading comics, or eating peanuts,
when they were not just sitting idle. Generally speaking, teaching
activity has been reduced to a minimum in terms of both time and
effort. And this pattern is not conﬁned to a minority of irresponsible
teachers—it has become a way of life in the profession’’ (PROBE Team
1999, 63). While it does not aim to make a case for private schools, the
PROBE report contrasts such teacher behavior in government schools
with that in private schools. It notes (p. 64) ‘‘the high level of teaching
activity in private schools, even makeshift ones where the work envi-
ronment is no better than in government schools.’’ Again on page
102 the report notes, ‘‘In most of the private schools we visited,
there was feverish classroom activity.’’ Also: ‘‘This feature of private
schools brings out the key role of accountability in the schooling
system. . . . In a government school the chain of accountability is
much weaker as teachers have a permanent job with salaries and
promotions unrelated to performance. This contrast is perceived with
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crystal clarity by the vast majority of parents’’ (p. 64). Other authors
too have noted lax attitudes and low teacher accountability (Weiner
1990). This, in turn, seems to have its roots, at least partly, in teachers’
own demands for a centralized education system (Kingdon and
Muzammil 2003).
It is thought that in explaining the increased popularity of pri-
vate education, the breakdown of government schools is often more
decisive than parental ability to pay. ‘‘In rural Himachal Pradesh, for
instance, there is a good deal of purchasing power but the government
schools function well, so that there are few private schools. In central
Bihar, by contrast, poverty is endemic, yet private schools can be found
in many villages due to the dysfunctional state of government schools’’
(PROBE Team 1999, 102).
6.2.2 Relative Costs of Private and Public Schools
Next I turn to the relative unit costs of private and public schools, that
is, the monthly cost of teaching each student. School expenditures in
India are dominated by salaries. For example, in government-funded
primary schools, salary expenditure as a proportion of total recurrent
expenditure was 96.7% in 1981–82 (table 6.4). Comparable expenditure
breakdowns are not available for private schools since ofﬁcial statistics
do not collect ﬁnancial data on private schools.
However, table 6.5 shows a comparison of per-pupil expenditures in
public and private schools in the Kingdon (1996) microstudy for Uttar
Pradesh, showing that in private schools, salaries account for a much
Table 6.4
Salary Expenditure as a Proportion of Total Education Expenditure
Year
Recurrent as a
percentage of
total educational
expenditure
Salary as a percentage of total recurrent
educational expenditure (%)
Primary Junior Secondary
1960–61 74.7 87.9 85.1 72.3
1965–66 79.4 90.7 89.2 75.3
1969–70 85.0 92.3 90.4 85.6
1974–75 87.1 96.6 94.3 87.1
1981–82 94.8 96.7 93.8 89.9
1987–88 97.3 NA NA 90.7
Source: Table 13.13 from Kingdon and Muzammil (2003).
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lower proportion of total spending (74%) than in government and
aided schools (97%). Table 6.5 also shows that recurrent per-pupil
expenditure in private schools was only 50% of that in government
schools and 55% of that in aided schools. The relatively low per-pupil
expenditure in private schools is due largely to the fact that teacher sal-
ary rates are far lower in private than government schools. Table
6.6 shows that the average teacher salary in private junior schools
was only 42% of that in government schools and 43% of that
in aided schools. This is consistent with ﬁndings from different parts
of India in the early- to mid-1990s (table 6.7). More recent ﬁgures in
the last two columns of table 6.7 show that the private-public salary
gap has increased greatly since the early- to mid-1990s. Private schools
pay teachers market-clearing wages that have grown only slowly,
whereas government and aided schools pay teachers prescribed mini-
mum wages that have risen inexorably and contain large economic
rents.
Table 6.8 presents cost per unit of output by school type. The ﬁrst
row shows that, on average, PUA schools are about twice as cost-
advantageous as G and PA schools. It also shows that there is in math-
ematics (but not in reading) an achievement advantage associated with
Table 6.5
Annual Per-Pupil Expenditures by School Type (Rupees)
Recurrent expenditure per pupil
School type Salary Non-salary Total
Salary as a percentage
of total expenditure
Government (G) 1958.40 50.00 2008.40 97.5
Aided (PA) 1780.93 46.87 1827.80 97.4
Private (PUA) 735.94 262.96 998.90 73.7
Source: Kingdon (1994), chapter 6.
Table 6.6
Average Monthly Salary of Teachers by School Type
School type
( junior schools)
Average gross salary of sample
teachers (rupees per month)
Government (G) 2449.04
Aided (PA) 2429.48
Private (PUA) 1036.73
Source: Kingdon (1994), chapter 6.
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attending a PUA school. Combining PUA schools’ 100% unit cost
advantage over G schools with their 13% mathematics advantage leads
to the conclusion that PUA schools are much more cost-effective than G
schools in their mathematics teaching. Another way of saying this is
that they produce the same level of numeracy skills as G schools at a
mere 44% of the cost of G schools. They produce the same level of
reading achievement as in G schools at half the cost. The comparison
of PUA schools with PA schools is of similar magnitudes.
To summarize, the results show that PUA schools’ ability to pay
market-clearing wages and, thus, their far more thrifty use of teachers
implies a large unit cost advantage over government-funded (G
and PA) schools. This reinforces their achievement advantage over the
other school types so that they are unambiguously and substantially
more cost-effective or internally efﬁcient than both G and PA schools,
which are roughly equally efﬁcient.
However, teachers’ objections to private school salary levels is that
market wages are not commensurate with the cost of (decent) living.
Whether one favors low market wages to achieve cost efﬁciency in ed-
ucation, or high minimum wages that protect teachers at the expense
of cost-efﬁciency, is not an ideologically neutral question. However,
it seems that in India, teacher salaries relative to per-capita income
are higher than in many other countries9 and that government-paid
teachers’ salaries have increased impressively in real terms: Dre`ze and
Table 6.8
Unit Costs, Achievement, and Cost per Achievement Point (G, PA, and PUA Schools)
G
(a)
PA
(b)
PUA
(c)
PUA:G
(c/a)
PUA:PA
(c/b)
PA:G
(b/a)
Cost per student (C) 2008.00 1827.00 998.00 0.50 0.55 0.91
Predicted mathematics
score (M)
11.38 10.09 12.80 1.13 1.27 0.89
Cost per mathematics
point (C/M)
176.00 181.00 78.00 0.44 0.43 1.03
Predicted reading
score (R)
13.78 13.73 13.82 1.00 1.00 1.00
Cost per reading point
(C/R)
146.00 133.00 72.00 0.50 0.55 0.91
Predicted total score
(T ¼Mþ R)
25.16 23.82 26.62 1.06 1.12 0.95
Cost per score point
(C/T)
80.00 77.00 38.00 0.47 0.49 0.96
Source: Kingdon (1996).
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Saran (1993, 32a) report that in 1993 a teacher’s monthly salary in
Palanpur (Uttar Pradesh) could buy very nearly twice the amount of
wheat that his monthly salary could buy in 1983. Kingdon and
Muzammil (2003, chapter 13) calculate that in the 22-year period from
1974 to 1996, teacher salaries in Uttar Pradesh grew by about 5% per
annum in real—that is, inﬂation-adjusted—terms. This is signiﬁcantly
higher than growth of per-capita real GDP in India over this period
which, according to Penn World Tables, was on average 3% per
annum.
6.3 Public-Private Partnership in Education in India
6.3.1 Historical Experience of PPPs
If private schools attract households, it suggests that parents perceive
them to be more advantageous relative to public schools. As Nechyba
(2005) states, ‘‘the nature of these advantages is likely to shape our
view of how the private sector can be most effectively mobilized to
advance academic achievement and other social goals.’’ The main
avowed advantage of public-private partnerships (PPPs)—publicly
funded but privately produced/delivered education—is that they har-
ness the energy, expertise, ﬁnancial acumen, management skills, and
(sometimes) resources of the private sector to create better value for
money for taxpayers (LaRocque 2004). It is thought that PPPs provide
a more ﬂexible way of producing education, since the private entity
running the school has more discretion about the running of the school
than is possible in public schools. Decentralized decision making at the
level of the school is thought to be more responsive to parents and to
foster local accountability.
In recent years there has been increased advocacy in favor of PPPs in
education. Any collaboration between public bodies such as local or
state government and private operators is referred to as PPP and there
are a wide variety of different types of PPPs in education in different
countries.
A substantial PPP system does operate in India, at least at the sec-
ondary and higher levels of education. This is the system of govern-
ment grant-in-aid to privately managed schools. According to the
Ministry of Human Resource Development (MHRD) cited in Bashir
(2005), in 1995–96 the percentage share of aided schools in total
schools was 34.0% and 44.3% respectively at the secondary and higher
secondary levels, though at the primary and middle levels, it was only
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3.4% and 10.1% respectively. According to University Grants Council
data in 2000–01, 42% of all higher education institutions in India were
aided, which closely match the MHRD ﬁgures.
There is great interstate variation within India, in the extent to which
aided schools are utilized at different levels of education. For instance,
in 2000–01, in Kerala 59.7% but in Uttar Pradesh only 1.6% of all pri-
mary schools were aided, although at the higher secondary level the
picture was very different: 42.6% of all Keralan but 74.7% of all Uttar
Pradesh higher secondary schools were aided (MHRD, quoted in
Bashir 2005). Grants to aided schools account for a substantial propor-
tion of the education budget, though again there is large interstate
variation, for example, in elementary education from 0% in Gujarat to
84.4% in West Bengal; in secondary education from 1.1% in Himachal
to 94.2% in West Bengal; and in higher education from 0% in Bihar to
87.2% in Maharashtra (Bashir 2005).
When India inherited this PPP system from the British in 1948, aided
schools avoided many government regulations and interference. For
instance, they had far more autonomy than public schools in deter-
mining staff disciplinary policies. Any recognized private school could
apply for government grant-in-aid and, once granted aided status, it
received a subsidy from the state government. Its teachers were paid
out of school revenues and were thus accountable to fee-paying
parents and to the school manager. They could be disciplined and
hired/ﬁred at the level of the school.
However, teachers of aided schools became increasingly unionized
and lobbied hard in the mid- to late 1960s to be paid directly by the
state government rather than via their private management which,
they claimed, engaged in unfair practices such as not paying fair
wages. Their intense lobbying and strikes helped the passage of the
momentous Salary Distribution Act (1971) in Uttar Pradesh and similar
acts in other states, such as the Direct Payment Agreement (1972) in
Kerala. These acts stipulated that aided school teachers’ salaries would
be paid directly to them rather than ﬁrst going to school management.
The acts represented a massive centralization of school management
and they reduced aided school teachers’ accountability to their local
managers (Kingdon and Muzammil 2003). Thus, over time, aided
schools have become increasingly similar to public schools because
their modus operandi has become more and more like that of public
schools. In addition to their teachers’ salaries now being paid directly
by the state government, their teacher appointments are made by an
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Education Service Commission of the state government, as for public
school teacher appointments. Given the similarities in the institutional
arrangements and teacher incentives in aided and government schools
in Uttar Pradesh, perhaps it is not surprising that, as seen earlier, there
is little difference between government and aided schools in terms of
either their effectiveness in imparting learning or in terms of their per-
pupil salary expenditures and per-pupil education expenditures.
Loss of local-level accountability (via centralizing legislation) is not
the only factor behind what is often seen as lax attitudes of teachers
toward their schools and students. One manifestation of poor atti-
tudes is their signiﬁcantly higher within-village teacher absenteeism
rates publicly than in private schools (Kremer et al. 2005), despite get-
ting salaries on average ﬁve times the private teachers’ salary rates
in the early 2000s (see table 6.7). The National Commission on
Teachers (NCT), the only government commission on teachers in post-
independence India, in a report written with much sympathy for the
teaching profession, blames teacher unions, suggesting that union-
backed teachers do not fear adverse repercussions if they are slack in
their work. The report of the NCT notes that ‘‘some of the Principals
deposing before it [i.e. before the Commission] lamented that they had
no powers over teachers and were not in a position to enforce order
and discipline. Nor did the district inspectors of schools and other ofﬁ-
cials exercise any authority over them as the erring teachers were often
supported by powerful teachers’ associations. We were told that there
was no assessment of a teacher’s academic work and other duties and
that teachers were virtually unaccountable to anybody’’ (National
Commission on Teachers 1986, 68).
This type of behavior is possibly further strengthened by the fact
that teachers (or rather, mostly their union leaders) are also legislators
in the state parliament, both as Members of the Legislative Assembly
(MLAs) and as Members of the Legislative Council (MLCs).10 In other
words, teachers have their sympathizers in the corridors of power,
who tend to shelter them in case any disciplinary issues arise. Aided
school teachers are in a politically particularly advantageous position
vis a` vis government school teachers: although they are publicly paid
workers, they are not debarred from contesting political elections be-
cause they are not deemed to hold an ‘‘ofﬁce of proﬁt’’ under the gov-
ernment (unlike government school teachers). As a result, aided school
teachers freely contest elections. The National Commission on Teachers
(1986, 68) stated that ‘‘the most important factor responsible for viti-
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ating the atmosphere in schools, we were told, has been the role of
teacher politicians and teachers’ organisations.’’
A further possible reason why aided schools—the Indian form of
educational PPP—perform no better than government schools in Uttar
Pradesh is that the government grant to aided schools is devoid of any
performance incentives. Despite the existence of certain rules and con-
ditions, the system of grants-in-aid in Uttar Pradesh is not linked to
the qualitative performance of schools. Even when the school’s grant-
in-aid was made conditional on satisfactory examination performance
of the school’s students, the pass rate was ﬁxed at a paltry 45%—that
is, it was required that only 45% (or more) of the students pass the
high school exam (and a student needs to get a mere 33% average
grade across all subjects to pass high school)! Similarly, low standards
are required for the minimum number of days the school must be open
in order to remain eligible for grants. However, there is little monitor-
ing or veriﬁcation of compliance with even these undemanding condi-
tions. On the whole, the system still leaves much to be desired and it is
not surprising because in practice, political maneuvers often overrule
the provisions laid down by the state government to sanction and reg-
ulate recurring and nonrecurring grants. The following observation of
Rudolph and Rudolph (1972, 105) with regard to the ﬂouting of condi-
tions of grants-in-aid still holds: ‘‘these grants in aid are technically
conditioned upon the maintenance of certain academic and adminis-
trative standards, but in reality an educational entrepreneur who
enjoys political favour has little difﬁculty in establishing his institu-
tion’s qualiﬁcation.’’
While the number of aided schools expanded tremendously in India
in the post-independence period, the system of grants-in-aid has re-
mained essentially the same as that introduced by the British 150 years
ago. By contrast, the British system of grants itself underwent revolu-
tionary changes and became more objective, particularly from the
1920s onward. What incentives can be built into public grants to pri-
vate schools is an area that deserves detailed study. A per-student (as
opposed to block) grant system may be desirable that relates a PPP
grant to various school performance indicators such as percentage of
total expenses spent on nonsalary costs (to encourage quality improve-
ments), percentage of total funds raised from nonfee sources such as
parental donations (to encourage equitable resource-generation), per-
centage of parents who are satisﬁed with the school (to encourage ac-
countability), and average number of students per class (to encourage
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cost-consciousness), and so on. A more rational grant structure could
be a policy correction that has potentially the biggest payoffs in terms
of improved cost-efﬁciency in Indian education.
In summary, while PPPs are in theory supposed to lead to better
quality schooling than publicly produced education, educational PPPs
in India—the private aided schools—mostly function no better than
public schools, at least at the junior and secondary levels in Uttar Pra-
desh where the author has done most of her research. An important
reason for this appears to be that, over time, in response to their teach-
ers’ demands, aided schools have become like public schools, with few
performance incentives and a lack of local accountability. Govern-
ments have lacked the courage to increase local accountability of teach-
ers, who constitute a well-organized group with powerful political
representation and strong unions: Kingdon and Muzammil (2003, ch.
10 and 11) show that teacher unions in Uttar Pradesh have opposed
government proposals to introduce local-level accountability.
This experience of PPPs in education in India has important lessons
for future education policy in India as well as for other countries. One
thing it suggests is that when PPPs in education operate side by side
with government schools, political pressure can mount over time for
comparable treatment of teachers across the two school types, and any
advantages of PPPs over government schools—if real—may not be
enduring. However, the experience of PPPs in education in other coun-
tries, for example, in the Netherlands and elsewhere, shows that the
build-up of such political pressure is not inevitable and that PPPs can
work well in education. Why PPPs function well in some countries
and apparently not in others is a research question that deserves atten-
tion. The devil seems to be in the detail of the PPP scheme—the design
features that distinguish one PPP scheme from another.
6.3.2 Proposed New Form of PPP in Education
One of the main provisions of the current draft Right to Education Bill
is that the national government will pay private schools for some pub-
licly paid places. This effectively proposes to introduce a new form of
PPP involving a per-student public subsidy to private schools, quite
different to the way Indian states have ﬁnanced private (so-called
aided) schools thus far, which is by paying block grants in the form of
salaries of all teachers of the aided school. The draft bill proposes to
oblige all private schools to give 25% of school places to students from
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‘‘the weaker sections of society’’ and the government promises to reim-
burse the private schools for these places ‘‘at a rate equal to the per
child expenditure in state schools/fully aided schools and state funded
pre-schools, or the actual amount charged per student by such school,
whichever is less, in such manner as may be prescribed’’ (clause 14.2,
chapter 4, Right to Education Bill, August 2005).
This is the ﬁrst time a post-independence Indian government has
sought to utilize the private sector to provide publicly funded educa-
tion (the aided school scheme was inherited from the British). Interest-
ingly, the scheme is championed not by the right wing, the usual
advocates of private education, but rather by those concerned with eq-
uity in education. Far from being the result of lobbying by the private
school sector for government funds, the scheme is rather generally
opposed by private schools on the grounds that mixing disadvantaged
children with those from well-off homes will be psychologically dam-
aging for disadvantaged children.
The bill and its provisions raise a number of important issues in
elementary education that have not been widely aired or seriously
debated. First, it has not been clariﬁed how ‘‘weaker sections’’ will be
deﬁned and chosen and how all disadvantaged children will get an
equal chance of access to private schools. Second, the choice of this par-
ticular way of providing ‘‘education of equitable quality’’ has not been
justiﬁed in comparison to other potential designs. Different designs,
depending on the alternative incentive structures inherent in them, can
address different educational efﬁciency and equity goals. For instance,
the bill proposes to give money directly to private schools to accept dis-
advantaged students rather than giving the same money as vouchers
(entitlements of a particular monetary value) to disadvantaged children.
The efﬁciency implications of these two ways of setting up the PPP
could be very different due to the differing potential for school compe-
tition under these two ways of providing the same amount of funding.
Whether money is given directly to the school (supply-side funding) or
via the students (demand-side funding) also has potentially different
equity implications because the matching of students to particular
schools is likely to be different under these two models. Third, the draft
bill could have major implications for the overall number of private
schools and their fee levels. It is unclear, for instance, whether pri-
vate schools’ response to the bill will be to create new places to accom-
modate publicly paid students or to replace 25% of existing students, or
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a bit of both. Moreover, since per-pupil expenditure in public schools is
much larger than fee levels in most private schools (which now pay
teachers on average one-ﬁfth the salary level of public schools, as seen
in table 6.8), the bill’s stipulations could well generally increase private
school fee levels.
This raises the question of why recommendations for decentralizing
reform in India, including the current draft Right to Education Bill,
have never included serious consideration of the possibility of provid-
ing school choice to students via vouchers, as a way of improving ac-
countability of schools and teachers towards parents, unlike in other
countries such as Chile, Colombia, New Zealand, the United States,
and the United Kingdom, where there has been vigorous debate about
and experimentation with vouchers as well as charter and concession
schools. There are several potential explanations for this omission, as
well as several concerns about school voucher schemes.
First, in India (and other poor countries), the most obvious failure
of public schools is their very visible lack of resources, infrastructure,
facilities, books, and teaching materials, and the obvious remedy is
seen to be for government to ﬁx these physical deﬁciencies. In many
other countries, the focus of school reform has moved to improving
incentives rather than inputs. Hanushek (2003) shows that while inputs
matter somewhat more in developing than in developed countries, the
provision of more resources does not raise student achievement levels
in the majority of studies.
A second plausible reason for India’s lack of consideration of a radi-
cal voucher-type reform is the fear of upsetting powerful vested inter-
ests such as teacher unions, which are likely to vehemently oppose
such proposals to increase local accountability. Unions have fought
hard over decades for legislation that shelters teachers from having
to be locally accountable, and successive Indian governments have
judged it politically infeasible to upset this powerful group that staffs
polling booths at election time.
Third, while the issues are complex and much debated, some
authors have raised concerns about adverse equity effects of vouchers
(Hsieh and Urquiola 2003; Ladd 2002; LaRocque 2004). They ﬁnd that
voucher schemes can encourage the relatively better-off students to
abandon public schools, supplement the voucher with private funds,
and take private school places, thus leaving public schools with the
less-well-off and often less-motivated students. However, Nechyba
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(2005) argues that the equity effects of school choice and PPP schemes
can be addressed by the way in which vouchers are designed. ‘‘In par-
ticular, one can design vouchers to be inversely related to household
income and to vary depending on student type thus offering increased
school resources to those who ﬁnd it disproportionately difﬁcult to af-
ford private school tuition and those whose children are disproportion-
ately costly.’’
Fourth, there would be concerns about implementation of school
choice schemes in the Indian context, such as: (1) the need to pro-
vide transport to nearby villages in order to offer real school choice/
competition in rural (low-population density) areas, which has its
attendant administrative and cost implications; and (2) the issue of
whether uneducated/illiterate parents are able to make informed
school choices. It may be argued that a voucher scheme will also be
problematic because of the lack of a strong regulatory system to ensure
schools’ compliance with standards and the scope for corruption in the
presence of weak monitoring and high costs of veriﬁcation. However,
it is well known that the current system also suffers from weak regula-
tion and widespread corruption (e.g., see Dixon 2005) so the question
is whether these difﬁculties would increase in the presence of voucher
funding of education, and the answer is unclear. The point here is not
to make a case for or against vouchers or any particular way of giving
funds to private schools but rather to say that all the above concerns
and issues are worthy of detailed consideration before the legislation
is ﬁnalized.
6.4 Summary and Conclusions
Analysis of education issues in India is hampered by the absence of
data on student achievement and partial coverage of schools in ofﬁcial
data. Nevertheless, it is clear that private schooling has mushroomed
in India, particularly at the primary level, where the government
does not exert control as much as it does in the higher levels. Private
schooling is also popularly utilized by families below the poverty line.
According to qualitative accounts, the growth of private schools is
greatest in areas where public schools do not function well.
Evidence suggests that private schools are more than twice as cost-
effective as government schools in the large northern state of Uttar Pra-
desh. In other states where this issue has been explored (Tamil Nadu,
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Madhya Pradesh, and Andhra Pradesh), private schools have also been
found to be generally more effective than government schools in
imparting learning, after controlling for student intake.
While aided schools—a form of public-private partnership in educa-
tion—are no more cost-effective than government schools in Uttar
Pradesh, this appears to be because over time they have become more
and more like government schools owing to aided school teachers’
successful lobbying for comparability of treatment vis a` vis govern-
ment school teachers.
The draft Right to Education Bill proposes to introduce a new form
of public-private partnership in the form of a per-student subsidy to
private schools, but the implications of this measure have not been
vigorously debated yet. Nor have issues of school choice and competi-
tion via vouchers to families been considered in terms of their quality
and equity effects, as compared with the current PPP proposal in the
bill that intends to give funds directly to schools. The drawbacks of
voucher schemes including problems of implementation were dis-
cussed, noting that some of the same concerns would also apply to the
currently proposed form of PPPs in the draft bill and noting that equity
concerns may be addressed by making the voucher amount inverse to
family income.
It is critical to have a full national debate about the merits and
drawbacks of the draft bill’s proposed way of giving funds to private
schools, in comparison with alternative PPP designs. In such a discus-
sion, it would be useful to learn from the mistakes and successes of
other countries that have tried alternative schemes for allocating public
funds to private schools. Moreover, there may be a case to make for
introducing the proposed measures on a pilot basis in one part of the
country—to observe their effects for a speciﬁc period, and then to
hone and improve what will potentially be a far-reaching and long-
standing measure.
6.5 Appendix
See facing page.
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Notes
1. In the state of Uttar Pradesh, to gain government recognition a private school must be
a registered society, have an owned rather than a rented building, employ only trained
teachers, pay salaries according to government prescribed norms, have classrooms of a
speciﬁed minimum size, and charge only government-set fee rates. It must also instruct
in the ofﬁcial language of the state and not be situated within ﬁve kilometers of a govern-
ment school (Kingdon 1994, chapter 2).
2. For instance, the condition to charge only government school-tuition-fee rates is
now incompatible with the condition to pay the government-prescribed salary rates to
teachers, since government school-fee rates have been cut consistently since the 1960s
and were abolished altogether in the early 1990s in all elementary schools, and since
government-prescribed minimum salaries to teachers have risen inexorably over time:
Kingdon and Muzammil (2003, chapter 13) estimate that average teacher salary rates
rose by 5% per annum in real terms in the 22-year period between 1974 and 1996.
3. The two sources are not exactly comparable since some school-going 6–10-year-olds
may attend preprimary or upper primary grades, i.e., be over- or underaged for their
grade.
4. Although ASER merged aided and unaided private schools into a single category, pri-
vate, at the primary level, there are few aided schools in most states so that the private
enrollment rates in ASER can be taken to mean mostly private unaided school enroll-
ments. ASER2006 found that 20.4% of boys and 16.8% of girls enrolled in grades one to
eight attended private schools. This 21% gender gap suggests one way in which girls are
discriminated against, namely via being substantially less likely to be sent to private
schools than boys (see Kingdon 2005).
5. Aggarwal (2000) found that in his four surveyed districts of Haryana in 1999, there
were 2,120 private primary schools of which 41% were unrecognized. The PROBE survey
of 1996 in ﬁve north Indian states did a complete census of all schools in 188 sample vil-
lages. It found 41 private schools of which 63% were unrecognized. Mehta (2005) found
that in seven districts of Punjab, there were 3,058 private elementary (primary and ju-
nior) schools, of which 86% were unrecognized.
6. Take the example of the junior (or upper primary) education level in urban India. Be-
tween 1993 and 2002, according to table 6.A.1, junior enrollment increased by 3,412,949.
Out of this, the enrollment increase in private schools was 2,447,513, which is 71.7% of
the total increase in junior enrollments.
7. While Kingdon’s study is based on students in the ﬁnal year of upper primary educa-
tion (grade eight), the other studies are based on students in the ﬁnal year of lower
primary schooling (grades four or ﬁve). The methods used differed too. Bashir used hier-
archical linear modeling, Govinda and Varghese used OLS regression, and Kingdon used
sample selectivity correction models. The extent of controls for home background dif-
fered across the studies too, as well as whether school and teacher characteristics were
included in the achievement equations. Finally the costs of private and public schooling
were calculated differently in the different studies. In all three studies, the stratiﬁed ran-
dom samples of private schools consisted of schools of all types—nonproﬁt, proprietary,
faith-based, high-fee and low-fee schools, etc.
8. The correction for sample selectivity reduces the private school achievement advan-
tage over government schools by a very large amount (compared to the OLS results in
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the last row of table 6.4). This large reduction is somewhat surprising since one would
not expect the unobserved factors (that remain after controlling for the child’s score in
the Raven’s test of ability and for a rich set of home background characteristics) to make
such a large difference to a child’s predicted achievement score.
9. For example, the ratio of (public primary school) teacher salary to per capita GDP in
the late 1990s was 1.15 in OECD countries, 4.4 in Africa, 2.3 in Latin America, and 2.9 in
Asia (UNESCO statistics, available at hportal.unesco.org/education/en/ﬁle_download
.php/i) but 8.5 in Uttar Pradesh, India (author’s own calculation).
10. The constitution of India guarantees representation to teachers in the Upper Houses
of state legislatures. Thus, uniquely among all worker groups, the teaching profession
has been singled out for this political privilege (see Kingdon and Muzammil 2003),
though Upper Houses now exist in only four large states in India.
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